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Cherishing diversity and promoting political
community
RAINER BAUBÖCK
Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna
Bhikhu Parekh’s voice has always been a distinctive one in the growing
chorus of political theorists who talk about the challenge of cultural diver-
sity. His perspective is not easy to classify. He criticizes liberal, communi-
tarian or neorepublican theories and yet combines their core ideas in his
own approach. Some readers of Rethinking Multiculturalism may feel that
his outlook is too ecumenical. Parekh defends not only cultural, but also
doctrinal diversity and this can occasionally be frustrating for critics who
expect a political theory to provide a straightforward path from first prin-
ciples to the resolution of hard cases. Yet Parekh’s book is not at all eclec-
tic. There is an underlying concern that organizes the text and gives it a
distinctive edge. In my reading this is the idea that cultural diversity is an
intrinsic value.
Most liberal theories see cultural diversity as a fact rather than a value.
Depending on their ranking of other values they arrive at quite different
perspectives on how public policies should deal with diversity. While some
argue for nearly unlimited toleration within a thin public sphere that
emerges only from a spontaneous consensus between cultural communities
(Kukathas, 1997), others defend an egalitarian conception of citizenship that
permits for cultural exemptions in a limited number of cases (Barry, 2000).
For Kymlicka (1995) the value of membership in a cultural community is
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derived from, and constrained by, what it contributes to the liberal value of
individual autonomy, whereas Rawls (1993) searches for a purely political
conception of justice that can be endorsed by liberal as well as non-liberal
doctrines. Levy (2000) defends a ‘multiculturalism of fear’ that is primarily
worried about the negative potential of humiliation and oppression in
contexts of cultural diversity, while Taylor (1992) focuses on the positive
values of dignity and authenticity that drive the politics of cultural recog-
nition. Parekh’s approach differs not only from liberals whom he accuses of
continuing a long tradition of moral monism, but also from communitarians,
pluralists and moderate nationalists who value the integrity of distinct tra-
ditions but want to limit diversity when it undermines homogeneity within
communities and cuts across their boundaries.
Parekh’s conception of diversity, however, is not a postmodern cel-
ebration of hybridity or cultural globalization either. While self-enclosed
cultures can be ‘repressive, intolerant, narrow, inward-looking and authori-
tarian’, culturally open ways of life risk becoming ‘shallow, eclectic, bland,
thin and devoid of coherence and historical depth’ (p. 172). Diversity is thus
only valuable if it is jointly generated by communities whose members are
not culturally footloose (p. 150) but cherish their own traditions. Parekh
also dismisses instrumental defences of cultural diversity on aesthetic
grounds or because it promotes competition and development. Instead, he
emphasizes its moral and political value. For individuals, diversity is a ‘con-
stituent and condition of human freedom’ (p. 167); it enables them to view
their own culture from the outside. For the wider society, recognizing the
value of diversity is the precondition for an ongoing crosscultural dialogue
that mediates conflicting claims of communities.
I find Parekh’s basic argument on these points convincing. Yet I have
some reservations about how he applies it within the political sphere.
Democratic citizenship and public policies must respond to cultural diver-
sity in society, but laws and policies have to be justified through reasons that
all citizens can share as members of a political community. The demands of
cultural communities must therefore be translated into the language of
citizenship. Most liberal and republican theorists have drawn too sharp a
line between, on the one side, a supposedly neutral and homogenous politi-
cal sphere and, on the other side, civil society as the realm of diversity.
Parekh, however, sometimes blurs this boundary to such an extent that the
two spheres and their distinct modes of integration are no longer recogniz-
able. I will pick out two propositions that nourish this doubt: first, Parekh’s
claim that individuals have an obligation to be loyal to their cultures and,
second, his suggestion that specific political arrangements for cultural com-
munities can be grounded in the value of diversity.
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1 CULTURAL LOYALT Y
Because sustainable diversity needs culturally rooted individuals, Parekh
proposes that individuals have obligations of loyalty towards the culture in
which they have grown up and towards the community that is associated
with this culture. We have duties of gratitude for what this culture has con-
tributed to our lives; duties towards mankind and future generations to pre-
serve and pass on what is of universal value in this culture; duties to defend
our cultural community when it is unjustly attacked from outside, but also
a special duty to criticize its internal injustices and repression (pp. 160–2).
From the perspective of a cultural community it is perfectly natural to
expect its members to be loyal for all these reasons. And because individuals
grow up in cultural communities, they normally develop a sense of belong-
ing that creates a disposition to be loyal. This disposition is generally
stronger than it is in voluntary associations whom we join in order to pursue
some specific interest. All this explains why cultural loyalty is widespread
and also why it would be wrong to expect individuals to renounce it in their
ethical choices. Yet I remain puzzled by the idea that we would also have
moral or political obligations of cultural loyalty. Isn’t the point of calling an
obligation a moral one that we regard it as binding even those who are not
disposed to comply with it?
Parekh himself is very clear that a legal obligation of cultural loyalty
would be illegitimate: ‘A culture has no authority other than that derived
from the willing allegiance of its members . . . no culture can therefore be
preserved by force or artificial means’ (p. 169). He even says that ‘(t)here
is nothing wrong with assimilation. If minorities freely decide to assimilate
into the dominant culture, their decisions should be respected and they
should be given every opportunity to do so’ (p. 197). How can this be recon-
ciled with a demand for cultural loyalty? Parekh could claim that external
pressure on a community to either preserve or abandon its culture in a
wholesale way is morally wrong but that it is also wrong for members of
such communities to disavow their cultural affiliations unless they have
strong reasons to do so.
Let me consider the second part of this proposition in the critical con-
texts of emigration and external attack. Do people who leave their home
country to earn a higher income elsewhere violate a duty towards their cul-
tural community because they will no longer contribute to its flourishing?
After establishing themselves in their new country of residence do they still
have an ongoing duty towards their culture of origin, for example to teach
their children their own native language? I think that if there is no pressure
on them to leave and no pressure to assimilate after immigration their
decisions to do so should be seen as morally unconstrained even if they feel
bad about them and are severely criticized within their community. But
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what if there is such pressure or if the community is unjustly attacked?
Resistance against coercive assimilation is admirable and external aggres-
sion against a cultural community will normally trigger an awareness of
belonging even among those who had previously dissociated themselves.1
Yet even in this case I wonder whether resistance and defence are a special
moral obligation towards one’s own community. It is wrong to blame the
victims of coercive assimilation for not resisting at all costs. If there is a truly
moral duty to denounce and resist attacks on a minority, it is the duty of
citizens who belong to the majority in whose name this aggression is
committed.
My conclusion is that we should distinguish more sharply than Parekh
does between the particular ethos of cultural communities and the moral or
political duties that are grounded in the human condition or in citizenship
of a democratic polity. The ethos of cultural communities will naturally
include duties of loyalty. We may want such communities to be able to
sustain that ethos and retain the voluntary allegiance of their members.
However, if membership is voluntary, exit must be an option that is not only
possible but is also accepted as a morally legitimate choice. While citizens
have a strong duty towards each other to respect their cultural affiliations
and to prevent unjust attacks on any cultural community, they are – as
citizens – not bound to remain loyal to their own communities even if this
is what their community rightly expects from them as long as they are
members.
2 THE VALUE OF DIVERSIT Y
Turning to my second question let me consider what is implied in calling
cultural diversity an intrinsic value. Diversity is, first, an important fact in
all periods of human history that results from the dual nature of human
beings as social and as self-interpreting animals. Diversity assumes, sec-
ondly, special features within modern societies, which are characterized by
dialectics of cultural homogenization through nation-building and of
increasing heterogeneity through crosscultural mobility and political mobil-
ization of minorities. Yet many societies have experienced and still experi-
ence cultural diversity as a predicament rather than an asset. As Rawls
(1999: 11–12) puts it, the task of normative political theory is to develop
realistic utopias that reconcile us with the facts of pluralism and diversity by
showing how these conditions contribute to justice and liberty. This implies
attributing value, but not necessarily intrinsic value, to cultural diversity.
We can regard the value of diversity as either derivative of, or instrumental
for the achievement of other values that are good in themselves. Lord
Dalberg-Acton’s (1907) defence of national diversity within democratic
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polities combines both these arguments: ‘Liberty provokes diversity, and
diversity preserves liberty by supplying the means of organisation’ (p. 289).
The value of diversity is, first, derivative, because it results from the exer-
cise of activities of speech, assembly and association that are universal
human rights and protected as basic liberties in all modern democratic con-
stitutions. It is not the particular content of the protected activities which
partakes in this way in the intrinsic value of liberty – there is no need to
attribute any value to the opinions of religious bigots or racists – but if we
value liberty we must necessarily also value the irreducible diversity of
cultural perspectives and ways of life. A desire for cultural homogeneity is
incompatible with a proper understanding of what liberty entails. Secondly,
the value of diversity is instrumental because, as Dalberg-Acton argues, cul-
tural and national diversity reduces the concentration of political power
within a state. Multinational diversity leads to federal arrangements of
power sharing between constituent units and multicultural diversity finds its
organized expression in civil society associations that lobby and control
public institutions.
One can probably provide similar arguments for diversity that derive
from, or are instrumental for, values other than liberty. The question is then
what is added by calling diversity an intrinsic value. Parekh suggests several
interconnected reasons: (1) ‘no culture embodies all that is valuable in
human life and develops the full range of human possibilities’ (p. 167); (2)
cultural diversity provides human beings with ‘mini-Archimedian stand-
points that enable them to view their own [culture] from the outside, tease
out its strengths and weaknesses, and deepen their self-consciousness’
(p. 167); (3) ‘The diversity of cultures also alerts us to that within our own’
(p. 168); and (4) it ‘creates a climate in which different cultures can engage
in a mutually beneficial dialogue’ (p. 168).
I agree with all this and want to highlight the political implications of
the last point. A ‘multiculturalism of fear’ (Levy, 2000) is similar to a
Hobbesian conception of political power as an external force needed to
overawe the anarchical interests and passions in society. It may support a
far-ranging accommodation of cultural claims for the sake of securing
peaceful relations between groups, political stability of states, and standards
of decency in social interaction. However, it cannot mobilize a common
sense of belonging and participation in the polity grounded in a mutual
appreciation of what each culture contributes. By contrast, Parekh’s theory
of diversity is more like a Rousseauian conception that regards citizens as
capable of governing themselves and of developing a commitment to a
common good. It should be easier to reconcile the occasionally conflicting
claims of democratic citizenship and of cultural community if both cultural
diversity and self-government are seen as good in themselves and as essen-
tial aspects of human freedom and well-being. However, in order to recon-
cile them, we first have to recognize their different logics. We should not use
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political criteria for the evaluation of cultures and we should not base
political decisions on reasons that are only available from within a certain
cultural perspective.
Parekh criticizes, for example, the ‘pervasive tendency among religious
people to claim to be in possession of divinely vouchsafed infallible truths’.
Because every religion is at least partly a human construction, he regards
this as ‘a wholly false reading of religion’ (p. 334). With such arguments
Parekh hopes to show that religious communities ought to accept the diver-
sity of faiths and the constraints of democratic society. This does not capture
the profound tension between a sincere belief in divinely revealed truth and
the demands of citizenship. Parekh attempts to derive a politically desirable
result from a certain interpretation of religion.2 Promoting interreligious
dialogue may help to prevent religious conflicts from escalating into
violence. But, as the document ‘Dominus Jesus’, which was recently issued
by the Vatican, shows, decades of peaceful dialogue may not shatter the
belief of religious authorities that they are in the exclusive possession of
revealed truth and that humanity would be better off if it were united in a
single church.
From the perspective of a democratic polity the value of religious diver-
sity is, on the one hand, that it creates a context in which even those who
hold such beliefs are likely to acquire a second, non-religious identity as
citizens and learn to respect and endorse arrangements that do not privi-
lege their faith. On the other hand, the value of a diversity of ways of life
can justify special exemptions from general obligations of citizenship for
groups like the Amish or certain monastic orders whose religious identity
forces them to withdraw from the public life of the wider society. What
political authorities cannot and must not do is to engage in interpreting
religious doctrines in a way that makes them more conducive for democratic
citizenship. This does not mean that religious arguments should be banned
in all deliberations about public policies.3 It does, however, imply that no
political decision is legitimate that can only be justified in terms of religious
reasons.
While cultural diversity may thus play a legitimate role in the justification
of special group rights, it is never a sufficient argument.4 If one wants to
promote diversity for its own sake, any rights claimed by one cultural com-
munity should be extended to all other groups of a similar kind. This would
undermine the special arrangements for Francophones in Canada and
Catalans in Spain, for Orthodox Jews in Israel and Muslims in India that
Parekh discusses and defends. It is only from a perspective of democratic
citizenship as a project of political integration in a society with a particular
composition and history that we can justify what otherwise must appear as
arbitrary privileges.
Cherishing diversity and promoting democratic community are then
mutually supportive but not identical tasks. Parekh’s book helps us to
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understand the complexity of each of these values. Future theories of multi-
culturalism can build on these foundations when they try to explain how
they relate to each other.
Notes
1 As Hannah Arendt put it: ‘If I am attacked as a Jew, I can only defend myself as
a Jew’.
2 This is somewhat similar to Locke’s (1956) argument for religious toleration,
which proclaims, contrary to evidence, that a church is ‘a free and voluntary
society. Nobody is born a member of any church’ (p. 131).
3 Contrary to what Parekh suggests on p. 89, Rawls’s (1999) conception of public
reason ‘allows us to introduce into political discussion at any time our compre-
hensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we give
properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive
doctrine is said to support’ (p. 144).
4 See also Bauböck (1999: 147–53).
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Thoughts on multicultural dialogue
IRIS MARION YOUNG
University of Chicago
The project of Rethinking Multiculturalism consists less of an effort to
develop a political theory of multiculturalism from the ground up than a
contribution to a conversation which has been going on for some time, even
centuries, to reflect on and evaluate positions that have been taken so far.
Parekh offers much that is fresh and original both in his critical review of
political philosophers on cultural pluralism, and in his account of culture,
human value, and the meaning of justice and equality in a multicultural
society. He is less disposed than many philosophers, however, to clear the
table of inadequate positions in order to replace them with his own. Instead,
he sifts through the previous discussion to find what wisdom there is, and
builds on it. In this respect as well as others, Parekh’s style and tone
exemplifies the dialogic attitude whose importance he also theorizes sub-
stantively in the book.
It would be tedious to try to summarize all the important points Parekh
makes, and the breadth of issues he treats makes the task too difficult in any
case. In the short space I have I will focus on how Parekh understands the
subject of a political theory of multiculturalism and the recommendations
about dialogue that he makes for it. To some of his interesting and provoca-
tive ideas I will add some of my own.
CULTURAL PLURALISM VS MULTICULTURALISM
Parekh distinguishes between the facts of a multicultural society, and a par-
ticular normative attitude to take toward those facts, which is multicultural-
ism proper. Nearly all societies in the world today and many of the past are
multicultural, that is, composed of several cultural groups who understand
themselves as distinct in certain respects but nevertheless interacting within
the society. Multiculturalism consists of the assertion of normative principles
that affirm the value of such cultural diversity in terms of equality between
groups, and the realization of these values in institutions and policies.
Despite the factual presence of cultural differences within them, few poli-
ties are adequately multicultural in this normative sense, and many explic-
itly reject such multicultural values. Parekh thinks that all multicultural
societies, however, ought to embrace multicultural values and policies.
Important chapters of Rethinking Multiculturalism evaluate contempor-
ary liberal approaches to cultural pluralism, particularly in the work of
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